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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to show how the smartification of
children’s toys impacts the concept of trust. We make use of the
4Cs conceptual trust framework – context, construction, curation,
codification – to analyse how the technological, commercial and
legal developments central to the arrival of the Internet of Toys
have an impact on the trust relations of children, parents and the
companies behind smart dolls. We found that the introduction of
smart dolls brings forth several trust issues. First, important
vulnerabilities, such as monitoring practices and data-sharing, take
place beyond the awareness of children and parents. Even if they
try to read the terms and conditions or look into the technical
specifications of the toys, these products remain black boxes
because the operating systems are proprietary and not all
information is disclosed or understandable. Second, with the
arrival of smart dolls, a form of hybrid ownership arises. Because of
the networked character of the dolls, they remain under the
influence and control of the company. Children and parents have
to trust the companies not to abuse this connection. And finally,
the regulatory framework that should protect children is not only
inadequate, it might actually exacerbate trust issues.
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1. Introduction
Almost all children in the Western world are online – and so are an increasing number
of the artefacts that surround them. Not merely computers – including smart phones
and tablets – but the mundane physical things around us, such as thermostats, televi-
sion and washing machines, are increasingly connected to the network of networks to
make our lives more fun and convenient. These interconnected items develop into
what are called ‘smart devices’ that are capable of predicting individuals’ preferences
and needs based on their online and offline behaviour. The Internet of Things – as
we call this phenomenon – is extending also to children’s toys, i.e. smart toys. Smart
toys are internet-enabled toys that interactively engage with children while they are
playing.
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The best-known example to date is Hello Barbie, which is an internet-connected
Barbie doll that talks to children and answers questions. When the doll is activated,
everything the child (or anyone else present for that matter) says is transmitted to
ToyTalk, a company that analyses the conversation and provides Barbie’s response to
the child within (milli)seconds (Gibbs 2015). Moreover, smart cuddly toys exist that
also allow children to chat with them as part of their play.1 The smart play experience
can be augmented by apps on smart phones and tablets. Additionally, smart computing
devices – such as smart phones, smart watches and tablets – have been developed as
children’s toys.2
The development of smart toys fits in with broader trends of hyper-connectivity, datafi-
cation and commercialisation (van der Hof 2017) and changes the trust relationship
between toy manufacturers and consumers by adding new complexities that tie in with
each of these tendencies. With traditional toys, trust is mostly a matter of expecting
toys to be appropriate in terms of physical safety. Some toys or the materials they are
made of are safe only for certain – mostly older – ages. Toys that become digitally con-
nected devices – despite superficially resembling their traditional counterparts – have
whole new trust dimensions added to the equation because the nature of the artefact
changes considerably and these changes lead to increased complexities.
Smart toys come in different forms but they have one thing in common. The develop-
ment of these toys is not just a feature of ongoing technological developments; their
emergence also reflects an increasing commercialisation of children’s everyday lives.
Playing with toys is no longer just that; the purpose and meaning of the toy changes
because its design changes – i.e. the artefact (in this case the smart toy) is augmented
by digital technologies. In other words, the toy becomes part of a meticulously orche-
strated game plan of companies in which they construct and script a world that may be
fun and entertaining but, more sophisticatedly, serves their economic interests. Hence,
a toy may – in the case of smart dolls – still look like its traditional counterpart, but in
fact, below the surface of their cute appearances, the identity and intentionality of the
artefacts have changed completely.
Trust in the relation between the manufacturer and the consumer starts playing a much
more pivotal role because of growing uncertainties. How is the child’s personal data used?
Who has access to it? Will the data be safe?3 Will the child or parent be informed when
data is compromised? Will the product be safe (e.g. not overheat or emit harmful radiation)
and secure? Can the child be manipulated by a talking toy? Etcetera. The answers to these
questions are not always easy – or possible – to find, and companies have no incentive to
be sufficiently open about some of them. Marketing works best, for instance, when people
are not aware of being manipulated, and numerous ways exist to trick people’s minds
without them noticing (Kahneman 2011).
The purpose of this article is to show how the smartification of children’s toys impacts
the concept of trust. To set the stage for our analysis we first outline important technologi-
cal trends (section 2). Then we will present the conceptual framework that will be used to
analyse smart toys in relation to trust (section 3). This conceptual framework encompasses
the four C’s – context, curation, construction, codification – that will in the subsequent sec-
tions (4 to 7) be used as lenses for the analysis of the concept of trust in relation to smart
toys. The article wraps up with conclusions in section 8.
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2. Technological trends
Current smart toys are indissolubly linked to the arrival of what has been called the Inter-
net of Things (IoT). The basic idea behind the Internet of Things is that by connecting phys-
ical objects, equipped with sensors, to the internet, it becomes possible to translate all
sorts of actions into computer-readable data. This is also referred to as datafication
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). The internet connection can be set up in
different ways. For example, smart doll Cayla connects via Bluetooth, whereas Hello
Barbie has a Wi-Fi connection. Based on data analytics and machine learning, the function-
ing of the device is adapted, blurring the boundaries between the physical and digital
world (Floridi 2015, 2). In practice, this means that internet-connected devices can,
amongst other things, communicate with each other, transfer data to third parties for ana-
lytic or other commercial goals, and proactively deliver services tailored to the needs of
users.
By adding this computational component to artefacts, they are increasingly becoming
‘smart’ (also see Kopetz 2011, 308). Fuelled by data analytics, these smart devices can
adapt their behaviour to their environment and users. In some instances, they can even
display a – limited – form of autonomy. While the networks of information in which
these smart devices are embedded are crucial for their functioning, they often remain
invisible to the user (Keymolen 2016, 147)
The development of smart artefacts in an IoT ecosystem has led to all sorts of new ser-
vices, which can be characterised as personalized, proactive and persuasive. The goal of per-
sonalization is to deliver content or services tailored to the explicitly provided or implicitly
determined wishes of users by making use of a set of technological features (Thurman and
Schifferes 2012, p. 776).
Hello Barbie, for example, makes use of speech recognition to adapt her answers to the
questions of children. The services delivered by smart artefacts are not only personalised
but also proactive or ‘anticipative’ (van den Berg 2009, 71), i.e. they precede the request of
the user. Smart dolls such as Cayla and Hello Barbie are designed in such a way that chil-
dren can, without extra action, just talk and interact with them. The smart dolls ask chil-
dren, for example, to sing or play with them. As smart artefacts can proactively deliver
personalised services, they can also become persuasive; they can ‘explicitly influence the
behaviour of users in specific directions, effectively persuading people to behave differ-
ently’ (Verbeek 2011, 19). Particularly in relation to children, this element of persuasion
– for example when children are influenced to buy certain products – may be a cause
for concern.
All in all, these technological developments have led to a specific kind of Internet of
Things, namely an Internet of Toys. Because of its ‘natural, interactive, adjustable character’,
the child-smart toy interaction goes considerably beyond the interaction with classic toys
(Chaudron et al. 2017, 14).
3. Conceptual framework: smart toys in relation to trust
Central to this article is the question how trust relations are shaped by the use of smart
toys. Trust is generally perceived as an important strategy to deal with the uncertainty
inherent in social life (Luhmann 1979; also see Möllering 2006). Early in life, children
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develop a sense of basic trust by interacting with their parents and siblings (Harris
2012). They need to experience and learn that they can rely on others. This basic
trust then serves as a stepping stone for relations outside the family domain,
enabling them to interact and cooperate in society (also see Giddens 1990, 1991;
Simpson 2012).
Although trust is a fuzzy concept, in the sense that it always seems to escape a final, all-
encompassing definition (Simon 2013), we can identify a minimal set of key concepts we
need to consider when analysing trust (Möllering 2006). First, we need to have at least two
actors: a trustor who has positive expectations of the actions of another actor, a so-called
trustee (idem 7).
Second, there needs to be something at stake for the trustor. She can be hurt – under-
stood broadly – by the actions of the trustee (idem 8). Trust is a risky business (Luhmann
1979) and is intrinsically connected to vulnerability (Baier 1986). If there is nothing to lose,
trust is redundant.
Third, trust cannot be enforced. The trustor is dependent on the actions of the trustee.
To speak of trust, the trustee needs to have agency.
Fourth, the fact that trust cannot be enforced means that it is also closely connected to
uncertainty. If you know for sure what the future will bring, trust is meaningless. Trust is a
strategy for dealing with the complexity brought by an uncertain future (Luhmann 1979,
1988). Rather than trying to diminish this uncertainty, trust is a positive acceptance of the
contingency of human life (Keymolen 2016).
Finally, trust entails a leap of faith. Although we don’t know for sure what the future will
bring, by acting as ifwe do know, social life is made possible. Möllering (2006, 6) states that
trust is ‘ambivalent’, ‘because it solves a basic problem of social relations without eliminat-
ing the problem’. Our interactions with others remain uncertain in a trust relation, but we
don’t let this stop us because we positively assume that this vulnerability will not be a
problem and that no harm will be done (idem 9).
Trust is not merely a strategy to deal with uncertainty in social interactions. As our inter-
actions are increasingly organised around, and moulded by, technologies, trust is also a
crucial factor when it comes to accepting new technologies (Kiran and Verbeek 2010;
McKnight and Chervany 2002; McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar 2002). It is important
to acknowledge, however, that trust in technology is a too broad an idea to be meaning-
fully addressed. Trust therefore should be understood as trust in specific artefacts to
perform a certain pre-defined task (Pitt 2010).
Simultaneously, the way in which trust is established is also shaped by the artefacts
involved (Kiran and Verbeek 2010). Technologies are not neutral instruments, but rather
they open up the world to us in a particular way; highlighting some parts of reality,
while letting other aspects recede into the background (Ihde 1990). Technologies
‘mediate what we believe to be the case, what we believe to be possible and what we
believe to be desirable’ (Swierstra and Waelbers 2012, 160).
In order to analyse how trust takes shape in the context of smart toys, it is important to
take into account the networked quality of these smart artefacts. In general, end-users only
perceive the application level of the internet – the apps, interfaces and smart devices –
while other crucial but intangible aspects are hidden behind the interface, such as algor-
ithms, databases, companies and regulators. To understand the impact smart toys have on
trust, it is key to look not only at what end-users such as children and parents directly
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perceive, but to include what takes place behind the interface, beyond their immediate
awareness. Based on the layered character of the internet itself, we will therefore
analyse trust on four different levels: context, construction, curation and codification
(Keymolen 2016).
3.1. The 4Cs conceptual framework
Context refers to the first-person experiences that users have. These experiences include
their interactions with others, with the smart toy they play with, and the relations
mediated by the smart toy (also see Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2011). It is generally accepted
that trust arises on this micro-level and can be seen as the starting point for understanding
how users build and experience trust.
Construction refers to the design of the smart toy, including both software and hard-
ware components. These technical components may present certain risks for the child
and its environment, for example when a doll might easily be hacked to access data
or can even be hijacked and controlled by a malicious actor. The way in which a
smart toy is built to a large extent also determines what a child can or cannot do with
it. The design of the artefact defines children’s so-called action space. The design of a
technology can be used to make certain unwanted behaviour impossible because the
functionality of the artefact simply does not allow it (‘techno-regulation’) (Leenes
2011; Lessig 2006; van den Berg and Keymolen 2017; Yeung 2017). Or certain incentives
can be built into it to persuade users to behave in a certain way (‘nudging’) (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008).
Curation refers to the actors governing the smart toy. This may include: the company
producing and selling the toy, the third parties who have digital access to the toy, and
the data analytics company providing speech recognition. The interests of these curators
do not necessarily align with those of children and their parents. When parents and chil-
dren become aware of such conflict of interests, for example due to negative media cover-
age, their trust vested in the smart toy and its curators may be challenged.
Codification refers to the rules and regulations put forth by the curators as well as the
legal frameworks and requirements they have to comply with. In theory, these rules and
regulations might add to the trustworthiness of the smart toy. However, it is not always
clear to parents and children what these rules and regulations – e.g. the terms and con-
ditions of a certain service – actually mean in practice, because they generally don’t
read them and if they do read them, they might not understand the vague and compli-
cated wording (see in general: Schermer, Custer, and van der Hof 2014).
4. Context
At the context level, we look at the way in which the user, from a first-order perspective,
experiences the smart doll and how, also from a first-order perspective, the smart doll
mediates relations with others (Verbeek 2010, 2009). In the case of the smart doll, the
relation of the child with the smart doll and the relation of the parent/caregiver with
the smart doll are key. Generally, in human-technology interactions, the interface plays
an important role, as it is the point where user and device ‘meet’ each other. When it
comes to the interface of the smart doll, two aspects stand out.
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First, where the interface of data-driven devices is generally a screen, the smart dolls,
being part of the Internet of Things, have a more tangible interface (Allen 2004). Hello
Barbie has a small button you have to push in order to start the conversation. When-
ever the child answers, the button has to be pushed again. It all is very easy to use. This
is important when it comes to trust as the ‘perceived ease of use’ may influence poten-
tial users’ decision to take on a certain device (Davis 1985, 1993; Venkatesh and Davis
2000).
A second aspect of the interface that stands out is that this tangible interface is not the
only interface. Hello Barbie comes with an app. The app also provides parents or caregivers
with an interface to interact with the doll. For example, all conversations the child has with
the doll are recorded and can be listened to through the parental account. Research indi-
cates that children are generally not aware of this second interface and its functionalities
(McReynolds et al. 2017). In their interaction with the doll, children might therefore assume
only that they are playing with the doll, while in fact the doll may also function as a moni-
toring device in the hands of their parents.
Next to the consideration of whether the doll is easy to use, there is also the question of
‘perceived use’ (Davis 1985, 1993; Venkatesh and Davis 2000) or, in other words, the ques-
tion as to what can be done with the doll – which is also important when it comes to trust.
Customer reviews4 and research (McReynolds et al. 2017) indicate that the speech recog-
nition technology is far from foolproof yet; the doll often goes into a loop and interactions
with the doll are still limited to certain predetermined areas.
Interviews with parents suggest that this limited functionality leads them to think that
control, for example on language use – what questions the doll should answer and in
which way – is not such a pressing issue (McReynolds et al. 2017). In other words, although
the limited functionality of the doll may be disappointing both for children and parents
(idem), on the other hand, the rather restricted interaction with the doll also makes it
more predictable and easier to trust.
4.1. Trust on the context level: some challenges
When analysing trust at the context level, the ability to learn from their interactions with
the user, and thus become smarter, is central to smart dolls given their machine-learning
capacities. As the companies behind the doll (also see section 5 and 6) record all conversa-
tions with Hello Barbie, they can use this data to improve their speech recognition tech-
nology. By contrast with analogue dolls where the functionality remains the same
throughout the whole life cycle, with smart dolls this is no longer the case. Current expec-
tations of parents and children concerning the – limited – functionality of the smart doll
may in the future no longer match the actual behaviour displayed by the doll after being
further smartified. Consequently, a breach of trust may appear when this mismatch
between expectations and actual functioning becomes apparent.
Next to trust in the functioning of the device, the smart doll also influences the trust
relation with parents and caregivers. Generally, children are unaware of the possibility
of their parents eavesdropping on their interactions with the doll. As a consequence,
when they find out, this can be experienced as a privacy breach and additionally as a
breach of trust. One child, after being told by his parent that all he had said to the doll
was recorded on the computer and could be played back so they (parent and child)
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could talk about it, responded: ‘That’s pretty scary’ (McReynolds et al. 2017). One strategy
to remedy this issue from a design perspective is to add recording signals to the device to
make explicit for the user when sound is being stored and to enable the adjustment of
privacy settings accordingly.
Finally, it has to be noted that trust on the context level is connected to what children
and parents perceive to be at stake. Notably, with smart and connected toys, what actually
is at stake – in other words, what makes users vulnerable – may to a great extent lie
beyond the interface, out of reach of direct experience. When it comes to the sharing
of data with third parties, data security and other privacy-related issues, users of the
smart doll need to look beyond the interface and delve into terms and conditions, the
website of the company and other sources to inform themselves. This crucial information
is not integrated into the design of the smart doll as such.5 As a consequence, the burden
of being well-informed weighs heavily on the shoulders of users. And even when users
take the time and effort to delve into the terms and conditions and privacy policies,
these documents do not always disclose all information or are drafted in very technical
and legal language (also see section 6 and 7).
5. Curation
Curation concerns the governance of a particular development by multiple actors, which
in the case of smart toys shows two distinct shifts. First, smartification of toys entails a
growth in the number of actors involved in offering and using the product as part of chil-
dren’s play experience. This results in a network of curators to operationalise the doll and
enable more sophisticated business models.
Second, the actual number of actors involved may not be immediately conspicuous to
consumers – parents and children – and their roles, responsibilities and mutual relations
are likely to remain rather opaque to most consumers as well.
Third, a direct relationship between the child and company is created. Internet-enabled
toys facilitate an – almost – continuous online connection between the child and the
company. Whenever the child presses the ‘on’ button, the smart toy connects to the inter-
net and, consequently, also to the company (or any other party to whom operational
activities have been outsourced). This section will set out who these actors potentially
are and what their role might be.
The most important actors are the companies developing, offering and operating smart
toys to consumers. By determining the functionalities of the smart product they greatly
influence how children play with them. These companies constantly need to come up
with novel and – nowadays – more interactive toys that chime with the digital environ-
ments and experiences of children. Smart toys can thus potentially gather a lot of data
about children. Children themselves – knowingly or unknowingly – impart data by
signing up for an account with the company, by interacting with the toy, and by installing
any other software – e.g. an app – that is necessary to properly use the toy. Smart toys can
be fun, entertaining and instructive to children, but those things are incidental to the end
of realising revenues by the companies. The objective of companies is first and foremost to
make increasing profits. Both the development of new products as well as finding ways to
collect and monetise personal data – or even better, a combination of these business
models – further these aims.
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The relationship between company and consumer may also become less straightfor-
ward if more than one company – or even a network of curators – is involved in develop-
ing smart toys and making them operational. Take Hello Barbie as an example.
Barbie is a brand owned by Mattel, a company which sells a wide range of Barbie dolls,
play-sets and accessories, as well as the WiFi-enabled Hello Barbie. The interactive experi-
ence of the Hello Barbie doll is, however, provided by ToyTalk, a company that develops
speech recognition technology. ToyTalk also stores recorded conversations between the
child and the doll on their cloud servers and analyses these data to improve user experi-
ence.6 Mattel, furthermore, engages service providers to help them operate and improve
Hello Barbie. What is unclear is who exactly these service providers are and whether they
include other parties besides ToyTalk (although their FAQs imply that they do).7 In order to
set up the doll, a smart device is required and software (from ToyTalk) needs to be down-
loaded in the Apple App Store, Google Play Store or Amazon App Store. On top of that, a
WiFi-connection via an internet service provider is needed to take advantage of the full
features of the doll.8
In addition, parents must get involved because they have to set up an account and give
permission to activate the interactive features of the doll. Through their parental account,
they can listen to and delete their children’s conversations with the doll.9
Given the smart design of the doll, it must comply with privacy and security laws (see
also next section), which may require the involvement of other third parties. Hello
Barbie was certified by the kidSAFE Seal Program as being compliant with US law.
The programme has been approved as a COPPA Safe Harbor Program10 by the
Federal Trade Commission, which is a US federal regulatory consumer protection and
competition agency.
In other (particularly EU) countries, data protection authorities can have a role in ensur-
ing the privacy and security of smart toys. Potentially, the interaction with Hello Barbie can
also lead to the involvement of law enforcement, if a review of the child’s conversation
with the doll raises concerns about the child’s or anyone else’s safety.11
5.1. Trust on the curation level: some challenges
As a consequence of this network of curators, it becomes clear that the whole idea of own-
ership is changing. Although the smart doll becomes one’s property and the user – in the
case of the child – develops a personal and intimate relation with it, the doll never com-
pletely becomes one’s own. Because of its networked character, the smart doll persists in
the sphere of influence of the different curators, creating a so-called hybrid ownership. This
poses two important challenges to trust.
First, taking into account the new business model underpinning smart toy compa-
nies, it becomes clear that the interests of the curators involved do not necessarily
align with those of the end users. Where the latter want to have a fun experience
playing with the smart doll, the former are mostly interested in monetising the data.
Conflicting interests may have a negative impact on trust, as they hinder the trustor
– the end user – to have positive expectations of the actions of the trustee – the
company.
Second, hybrid ownership does not entail that each and every curator ‘owns’ the smart
doll in similar ways. Whereas the company behind the smart doll can adapt the core
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settings of the device through updates or change data flows, the control of end users is
limited to what is allowed by the smart doll company. Or, to borrow a term from STS,
the ‘interpretative flexibility’ – the room one has to tweak and adapt a device – is
greater in the relation between the curator and the smart doll than in the relation
between the consumer and the smart doll. This difference in control may result in trust
issues when parents and children are confronted with changes carried through by the
company that they dislike or even disagree with.
6. Construction
When we look at trust at the construction level – thus focusing on the technical aspects of
the doll – we immediately encounter a crucial difference between the old-fashioned ana-
logue doll and the smart doll. Safe use of the former focuses first and foremost on physical
safety. Toys should, amongst other things, be free of small or removable parts, not have
sharp edges and be free of toxic materials such as lead-based paint (Schmidt 2008;
Taylor, Morris, and Rogers 1997). While these safety requirements obviously remain
valid for smart toys, they are no longer sufficient given the new vulnerabilities that
come with the data-driven nature of the smart doll.
Moreover, in trying to assess the safety of the data-driven nature of these dolls, we
encounter the problem that smart dolls are powered by proprietary systems. Mattel and
ToyTalk are not keen on issuing detailed technical and/or security information on their
smart toys. As a consequence, these devices become so-called black boxes, inherently
hard to scrutinise (Pasquale 2015).
Notwithstanding the difficulty of mapping information flows and security measures in
smart toys, some information has recently become available through the work of indepen-
dent white hat hackers who unofficially test the devices and warn of safety and security
issues (Chaudron et al. 2017, 8). Although it is an essential legal requirement to ensure
sufficient levels of security when processing personal data,12 these hackers found that
device security can be compromised on three different levels. First, the doll can be
hacked and used as a surveillance device. Second, the doll can be hijacked to behave
badly or erratically. Finally, the doll can be used to track the geo-location of children (Chau-
dron et al. 2017, 9; Holloway and Green 2016, 2). Notwithstanding these reported vulner-
abilities, no malicious attacks involving smart toys have yet been reported.
The problem of device security stems from the fact that the microchips and sensors in
connected toys ‘are often cheaply made or manufactured without much apparent quality
control’ (Forbrukerrådet 2016, 34-35). In addition, another security study ordered by the
Norwegian Consumer Council underlines that as Hello Barbie is Wi-Fi-enabled, she is in
theory vulnerable to attacks from anywhere in the world. By comparison, other toys,
such as smart doll Cayla, pair to a tablet or phone via Bluetooth. As a result, they can
only be hacked when the hacker is in the close vicinity of the doll. However, when an
attacker is able to reside in close range of the device, it becomes relatively easy to
connect to it through Bluetooth (Bouvet 2016, 15). All in all, the connectedness, which
is key to the optimal functioning of the smart doll, is in turn its weak spot from a security
perspective.
Moreover, it is important to understand how the construction of the smart doll steers
the interaction with the child and shapes its action space. The report of the Norwegian
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Consumer Council indicates that smart toys are programmed in such a way that they
confirm certain sexism biases. For example, Hello Barbie is much more interested in
talking about clothes and toys, whereas the smart robot i-Que (targeting boys) ‘steers
the “conversation” towards science, lasers and silly jokes’ (Forbrukerrådet 2016, 35).
Gender stereotyping is worrisome because of its potentially negative impact on the
social and cognitive development of children, given that ‘if children choose or are
offered almost exclusively gender-specific toys, they may only be able to build skills and
competencies associated with such toys’ (Weisgram, Fulcher, and Dinella 2014, 401). More-
over, in their technical tests the Norwegian Consumer Council found that the Norwegian
version of apps accompanying the smart toys Cayla and i-Que blacklisted certain words
and concepts, such as ‘homosexual’, ‘bisexual’, ‘lesbian’, ‘LGBT’ and ‘atheism’ (idem).
They also uncovered a blacklist of crude words and concepts, which are deemed to be
controversial, such as: ‘menstruation’, ‘scientology member’ and ‘violence’ (idem). All in
all, these findings illustrate that certain norms and values are built into the technical
design, guiding the interaction with the child. However, such values and norms by
design are not apparent from looking at the toy; e.g. whereas a doll still looks like a
girl’s toy, gender bias may run much deeper now the child is able to talk to the doll
and have conversations which further reinforce gender stereotypes. Such manipulation
by the toys can have an impact on the trust relation with the end user.
6.1. Trust on the construction level: some challenges
Due to their connectedness and data-driven nature, smart toys impose new vulnerabilities
onto children and their parents. While it has always been part of the consumer-manufac-
turer relation that the former had to trust the latter to deliver safe products, adhering to
the requirements set in relevant legal provisions on toy safety,13 now the additional matter
of device security, covering issues such as data integrity and the security of chips and
sensors, is added to the equation. Consumers expect companies to take the necessary
measures to ensure a safe and secure interaction with the purchased smart toys.
However, trust in the construction of smart toys is challenged in four ways. First, due to
the fact that most smart dolls function as black boxes, hiding their proprietary data-driven
systems from public scrutiny, it is unclear what is actually at stake for children and their
parents (also see Pasquale 2015). As there are many possible points of access to the
device or to the data collected through the device – from servers to Bluetooth connection
– trust is actually distributed over a whole network of actors and is therefore much more
complex than users are generally aware. Although trust is always blind to a certain extent –
otherwise it would be redundant – it may be too blind on the construction level.
Second, what is secure now might not be so tomorrow. One of the challenges for IoT
devices is that they constantly need tobeupdated andmonitored to remain safe in the cyber-
security arms race. End users, therefore, not only need to trust companies to sell them safe
products, they also have to trust them to keep these products safe throughout their complete
life cycle.
Third, especially on occasions when risks materialise and end users are harmed, it
becomes apparent whether or not trust was rightfully given. These moments of reflection
are valuable, as they encourage people to rethink the trust they vested in others and, if
needed, adapt their behaviour. However, it has to be noted that when end users are
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confronted with a hacked smart toy, they might also face a problem of attribution. As is
typical of cyber-related attacks, it often remains unclear who the attackers are, what their
motives behind the attack were, and what the actual nature of the attack is (Singer and
Friedman 2014). This uncertainty inherent in cybersecurity issues makes it hard for end
users to determine if a smart toy has been compromised in order to gain access to personal
information, to undermine the system of the company behind the smart toy, or to hinder
users’ handling of the toy. This attribution problem will only add to the decline of trust in
smart toys and the companies behind them. While hijacking a smart doll and making it
act erratically is definitely something which will make users explicitly question their trust
in the doll, other forms of hacking may, however, be much more covert, leaving the trust
relation inadvertently intact. For example, hacking a doll in order to harvest data or track
a child will generally happen beyond the awareness of children and their parents. The
absence of a feedback loop prevents users from being probed to evaluate their trust,
where otherwise they might have been, had the damage they suffered been more evident.
Finally, in addition to the challenges of device security for trust, the way in which the
doll is programmed also brings uncertainty. The ethical choices concerning topics that
are deemed relevant and appropriate for the smart doll to address may have an impact
on children’s development. Therefore, parents have to trust the companies to make
responsible decisions on this matter, as it is too cumbersome and complex to check all
possible conversation interactions before handing over the doll to the child. Moreover,
parents must trust companies not to manipulate children in ways that reinforce certain
prejudices and curtail freedom of information.
7. Codification
Adequate legal frameworks are essential from a trust perspective. Both from a data protec-
tion and children’s rights perspective, we can point to various issues that may undermine
trust. The problem is not always that laws are not in place, but rather that currently they do
not provide adequate protection – by definition or because of a lack of implementation or
enforcement (see e.g. Forbrukerrådet 2016). This section will not provide a full-blown legal
analysis of smart toys but will address some pertinent issues and opportunities.
As a result of the direct relationship between child and company, companies can collect
– potentially very sensitive – personal information from children in ways that were imposs-
ible before the advent of networked technologies and smart toys. Protection of children’s
personal data is a crucial underlying legal interest in the General Data Protection Regu-
lation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018 (see Recital 38).14 Such protection is
amongst other things intended to be achieved by providing parents with control over
their children’s personal data (or to be more precise by requiring them to consent to
the processing of such data) (article 8, GDPR). Given the complexity of smart toys in
terms of construction and curation, and the lack of meaningful choice in protection
through parental control, it is essentially an illusion (Schermer, Custers, and van der Hof
2014; van der Hof 2017). Parents generally do not read privacy policies nor would they
gain a meaningful understanding of what happens to their child’s data if they did,
given that the terms formulating data practices are often vague. Besides, free choice is illu-
sory; choice only exists between using or not using the smart toy or its full array of func-
tionalities (also see section 6 on hybrid ownership).15
JOURNAL OF CYBER POLICY 153
Spaces to escape from parental surveillance can be part and parcel of children’s percep-
tions of privacy, often even well before they become teens (Shmueli and Blecher-Prigat
2011). Children’s rights to privacy (article 16, UN CRC) and play (article 31, UN CRC) go
hand in hand, and require children to have intimate safe spaces free from – corporate
or parental – surveillance in order to encourage and respect their right to optimal devel-
opment (article 6 UN CRC) – yet another fundamental right of the child. However, in the
case of for instance Hello Barbie, all conversations with the doll are stored by and made
available to ToyTalk as well as to parents through a dedicated parental account.
7.1. Trust on the codification level: some challenges
Inadequate legal protection raises uncertainty as children and parents cannot be sure that
certain privacy and security risks are being mitigated on their behalf. Specifically, it exacer-
bates trust issues given the potentially sensitive information that is involved in playing
with toys that interactively question a child in the privacy of their room, as well as possible
security breaches that may occur with respect to data.
Moreover, the important role that has been assigned by the GDPR to the consent of
parents and the control parents have – to a certain extent – over the data of their children
may burden the trust between children and parents. Children have to trust their parents to
make well-informed decisions on the processing of their data. However, as has been
repeatedly argued in this paper, due to the complexity of both the construction and
the terms and conditions accompanying smart toys, it is highly unlikely that parents
fully grasp what they are actually consenting to.
Furthermore, children have a perception of privacy vis-à-vis their parents. Giving parents
the ability to check their children’s conversations with smart toys, potentially even behind
their backs, raises new trust issues in their relationship. Knowing that their parents have
full access to interactions with smart toys can have a chilling effect on children’s playful
activities. Some instruments – if implemented well – may, however, be able to encourage
trust and mitigate some of the aforementioned legal inadequacies. First, the principles of
privacy by design16 and privacy by default17, as recognised by the GDPR, can restore
some of the power imbalance and surveillance issues between children and parents on
the one hand and the array of commercial parties involved on the other (van der Hof
and Lievens 2018, 35-38). Equipping smart toys with strong anonymization and data mini-
misation serves both the protection of children and their rights as well as supporting the
security of the product, given that no personal data or merely data that is relevant to the
use of the toy is processed by the company and only as long as that data is necessary.
Second, according to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the children’s rights
framework requires an impact assessment with respect to any implementation of law and
policy that has an impact on children.18 In essence, this entails continuous monitoring of
the interests and rights of children in relation to the protection of children against corpor-
ate and other forms of surveillance under the GDPR, potentially also as part of data pro-
tection impact assessments (van der Hof and Lievens 2018, 38-40).
Besides other rights already mentioned, most notable is the right of children to be pro-
tected from economic exploitation (see article 32 UN CRC). State parties in particular have
an obligation to ascertain whether actions by the private sector are in the best interest of
the child (and hence are in line with the rights of children and other protective legal
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provisions). Moreover, such an assessment requires states to evaluate to what extent the
legal protections in place are adequate and effective.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the way in which the use of smart dolls impacts trust. As
smart toys are networked devices, bringing together a heterogenic web of actors and
interests, we took a layered approach and examined trust on four levels: context, curation,
construction and codification.
On the context level, we found that the trust of users in smart dolls is largely based on
their first-hand experience. What happens behind the interface – data collecting and
sharing, personalisation – often remains out of sight. As a result, trust vested in the
smart doll often does not cover these actions; notwithstanding they do render the child
and its parents vulnerable.
One of the challenges when it comes to trust in smart toys is that their ‘identity’ does
not necessarily remain the same throughout their whole life cycle. Through machine learn-
ing and data analysis, their performance may evolve. This implies that trust in the smart
doll should be approached as an iterative process rather than a one-time-only decision.
Parents and children should on a regular basis confront their positive expectations of
the doll with the actual functioning of the doll. As it is not to be expected that parents
and children will do this proactively, this might require changes in the construction and
codification of the smart doll. One could think of adding a warning signal to the design
of the doll that notifies the user when a new stage of smartness is about to arrive, and
to force companies to provide clear information on any new processing of personal infor-
mation as well as to renew consent if necessary (although the latter strategy may have a
negative effect on the trust relation between children and parents).
On the curation level we found that the networked character of the smart doll allows for
a new form of hybrid ownership. As smart dolls remain under the control of the manufac-
turers, a shift in power occurs. Whereas with traditional dolls, after purchase the toy
becomes truly one’s own, with the smart version the doll remains under the control of
the company. Children and parents have to trust the companies connected to the doll
to act responsibly and to take their interests into account when for example updating
the system or changing the settings.
That children and parents are vulnerable and dependent on the actions of the producers
of the smart doll becomes conspicuously clear when looking at the construction level. As
smart dolls are based on proprietary systems, companies are reluctant to share information
on their functioning and security. In practice, smart dolls are black boxes and end-users
simply have to trust that proper measures have been set in place to protect them.
One way of dealing with these new uncertainties is by installing and enforcing an ade-
quate legal framework. Such a framework can ensure that companies and manufacturers
perform in a predictable and trustworthy way. However, analysing trust on the codification
level, we found that although the protection of children’s personal data is covered by the
GDPR, this is not sufficient and actually may exacerbate trust issues, particularly in the
relation between children and their parents. The key role assigned to parental consent
may have as an unintended consequence that children circumvent asking their parents
for permission. Having a perception of privacy vis-à-vis their parents, children may find
JOURNAL OF CYBER POLICY 155
themselves in the position that they need to breach the trust of their parents in order to
make use of smart toys and online services they deem highly important to their social life.
Our analysis of trust and smart dolls shows that trust challenges are closely linked to the
potential commercial, technical and legal issues arising from the smart and networked
character of these dolls. As most of these issues are currently tucked away behind the
interface, eluding the attention of parents and children, companies do not have a
strong incentive to address them. However, we foresee that with the further growth of
an Internet of Toys, the exposure of vulnerabilities will increase and so will awareness.
An advancing political and legal interest in informational privacy and cybersecurity
must lead to more stringent regulation and enforcement, which will require the hidden
actors behind the interface to be more transparent about the processes in which they
engage. Without transparency, sooner or later trust will evaporate.
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